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Academic attention to populism has sharply increased in recent years. Yet, a commonly
accepted deﬁnition is still lacking, with scholars disagreeing on categorization, labels, and
boundaries between its different manifestations. In this article, through an analysis of
Euromanifestos and party statutes, we address the interactions between Italian political
parties and populism by adopting the various deﬁnitions available in populism theory, that
is, populism as (i) ideology, (ii) rhetoric, (iii) communication style, and (iv) organization.
Our aim is to identify all major attributes linked to populism and empirically investigate
them with lower level indicators, measuring and comparing them across Italian parties and
over time. The empirical analysis, conducted through a formalized content analysis of the
European electoral programmes and party statutes, considers populism not as a discrete
concept but rather as a continuous one and therefore enables us to undercover the variety of
populisms within the Italian parties. The main ﬁnding of the article is that over the last
decades all Italian parties have shown some signs of populism and that the intensiﬁcation of
populist features is strongly linked to the exarcebation of the ﬁnancial and economic crisis,
and its governance.
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Introduction: populism: a contested deﬁnition
Academic attention to populism has sharply increased in recent years (e.g. Verney
and Bosco, 2013; Kriesi, 2014). Yet, a commonly accepted deﬁnition is still lacking,
with scholars disagreeing on categorization, labels, and boundaries between its
different manifestations (Mudde, 2004). Some authors also stress that there is an
abuse of this term in the public discourse. More speciﬁcally, one of the difﬁculties
regarding the deﬁnition of populism is that it has been applied (and adapted) to
several very different historical phenomena (movements, parties, regimes, intellec-
tuals), across various periods, and often it has been used in a pejorative tone. In this
article, we address the interactions between Italian political parties and populism,
understood as an analytical tool, through an investigation of Euromanifestos (from
2004 to 2014)1 and party statutes. From a theoretical perspective, populism has
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been conceptualized as (see also Caiani and della Porta, 2011) (i) a political rhetoric
that is marked by the ‘unscrupulous use and instrumentalization of diffuse public
sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment’ (Betz, 1994: 4) and appeals to ‘the
power of the common people in order to challenge the legitimacy of the current
political establishment’ (Abt and Rummens, 2007: 407); or as (ii) a ‘thin’ or ‘weak’
ideology, that considers ‘society to be ultimately separated in two homogeneous and
antagonistic groups: ‘the pure people’ vs. ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that
politics should be an expression of the volonté générale of the people’ (Mudde,
2004: 543). Elements of this ‘thin-centered ideology’ (Freeden, 1998) concerning
the structure of power in society are the references to antagonistic relations between
the people and the elite, the idea of restoring popular sovereignty, and a conception
of the people as a homogeneous body. A speciﬁc feature of this ideology is its
‘indeterminancy’ that ‘responds to its need to be adaptable’ (Ruzza and Fella,
2009: 3). Finally, populism has been also deﬁned as (iii) a type of organization,
characterized by the presence of a charismatic (new kind of) leadership (Taggart,
2000; Eatwell, 2003), and (iv) a special style of communication (Tarchi, 2002;
Jagers and Walgrave, 2007), namely without intermediaries. In particular, the
presence of a charismatic leader – such as Haider, Le Pen, Bossi, Salvini, and
others – adopting a certain style and rhetoric (Mazzoleni, 2003) is seen as a crucial
characteristic of populism (Pasquino, 2008). Populists are successful due to their role
as ‘taboo breakers and ﬁghters against political correctness’ (Mudde, 2004: 554). They
usually appeal to emotions of fear and enthusiasm (by employing higly emotional,
slogan-based, tabloid-style language), adopt a demagogic style, and refer to resent-
ment, offering easy solutions for complex problems, and combining ‘verbal radicalism
and symbolic politics with the tools of contemporary political marketing to dis-
seminate their ideas among the electorate’ (Mazzoleni et al., 2003).
Deﬁnitions of the concept, however, generally converge in seeing as a core aspect
of populism its focus on ‘the people’. Populist movements attempt to create a direct
connection between the people and the political power, bypassing the electoral
process. They often consider the people’s aspirations to be betrayed by corrupt
political elites (politicians both from the government and the opposition) (Rydgren,
2007) and suspect that a conspiracy against the people is taking place (Taggart,
2000). The charismatic leader (‘the savior’) is the only one who embodies the will of
the ‘common people’ and is able to speak on their behalf. However, also the very
deﬁnition of the ‘people’ remains ambiguous in the use of populists, and competing
interpretations try to clarify who ‘the people’ actually are. Indeed, some see the
people in terms of class or ethnicity (e.g. Di Tella, 1997; Mény and Surel, 2002),
whilst others refer to ‘the heartland’, namely a place in which ‘in the populist
imagination, a virtuous and uniﬁed population resides’ (Taggart, 2000: 95).
Moving from theoretical deﬁnitions to empirical cases, one is impressed by the
enormous variety of populist movements (Luther, 2003; Tarchi, 2015), which may
be very differentiated. For example, if a typological criterion is adopted, we can
distinguish between right-wing and left-wing populist movements. Whereas the
2 MANUELA CA IAN I AND PAOLO R . GRAZ IANO
latter identify the ‘people’ in socio-economic terms, such as the working class
exploited by the bourgeois elite, the former refer to the ethnic nation (Abts and
Rummens, 2007). Today, populism is above all found on the extreme or radical
right (e.g. the Austrian Freedom Party, the French National Front, etc.) (Mudde,
2002; Rydgren, 2003; Laycock, 2005) but it can also be related to the radical left
(e.g. March, 2007; Zaslove, 2008). Beyond populism on the fringes of the political
spectrum, observers also underline the increasing importance in Western Europe of
a type of ‘mainstream populism’ (e.g. Tony Blair in the United Kingdom, see
Mair, 2002), as well as a ‘centre-right populism’, considering for instance Silvio
Berlusconi one of the best examples in Europe of this category (e.g. Campus, 2006;
Pasquino, 2007). In this article, we will consider all these four main dimensions of
populism – political rhetoric, ideology, type of organization, and style of commu-
nication – testing their empirical applicability on the Italian case. Our analysis
suggests that a combination of these key elements is better than mutually exclusive
(dichotomic) deﬁnitions, as it can shed new light on a variety of different forms of
populism and be applied more generally across different contexts and times.
Research design: concepts, methods, and case selection
Taking into account these scholarly reﬂections, our article aims to appraise the ‘degree
of populism’ within Italian political parties with a particular focus – linked to the
overarching topic of the special issue – on the European elections. Our key leading
research questions are as follows: How ‘much’ populist are Italian parties? Which
parties are populist? Only those that traditionally are deﬁned as such or also the
mainstream ones? Are there degrees of populism? In general, and beyond the Italian
case, an empirical analysis of populism seems particularly useful as the literature on
populism is ‘populated’ with several deﬁnitions under the form of speciﬁc attributes in
order to categorize parties as populist or not (in a dichotomous manner), but there still
is limited empirical research about how concretely parties may put together the various
‘populist’ attributes. This article aims at ﬁlling this gap, starting with the Italian case.
More speciﬁcally, the added value of this article is to adopt a ‘radial’ conceptualization
of populism which can have a minimal and all-encompassing deﬁnition such as: (a) an
ideology which thematizes the virtues of the ‘people’ against the ‘establishment’ or the
‘ruling elite’; (b) a rhetoric which emphasizes the delegitimation of the old political
actors and their proposals, and legitimizes the newpolitical actors; (c) a communication
style which is non-institutional and informal, and offers easy solutions to complex
problems; (d) an organization characterized by a concentration of party power in the
hands of a leader and by a personalization of party/leader – party/members relation-
ship. Each of these dimensionswill be considered in our study to ‘measure’ the degree of
populism in the Italian parties, through an in depth content analysis of the Euro-
manifestos and party statutes.
For example, for populism as rhetoric, we have developed three indicators. In
particular, there must (1) be delegitimation of political institutions and other
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political actors and their proposals; (2) instrumentalization of diffuse public sentiments
of anxiety and disenchantment; (3) legitimation of new political actors (i.e. the so-called
sublimation of the ‘redemptive’ side of politics – Canovan, 1999). For populism as an
ideology, (1) there must be references to ‘the people’ (or ‘common people’, ‘ordinary
men’) whose interest are said to be represented by the populist party; (2) manifestos
have to include proposals to create a direct relationship between the people and the
power holders; (3) they have to contain antagonistic relations between the people and
the elite (i.e. anti-establishment or anti-elite statements), etc. (for more details on the
codebok used, the indicators elaborated for these four dimensions and their measure-
ments, see Table A1 in the Appendix).
In other words, this article uses the many deﬁnitions available in populism theory
to identify all major attributes linked to populism and empirically investigates them
(with lower level indicators), measuring and comparing them across italian parties
and over time. This allows the appreciation of populism not as a ‘static status’
(generally considered pathologic) that a party may have or not have, rather as an
observable (and ‘measurable’) phenomenon which may concern all political parties
present in a given domestic political community.
Although this is an exploratory research effort, we are also guided by the
hypothesis that we should expect growing populist features due to the presence –
after 2008 – of an ‘exogenous shock’ such as the ﬁnancial and economic crisis. We
focussed on the seven electorally most relevant parties which over the years have
obtained seats in the European Parliament: the Northern League (NL), Unione di
Centro (UDC), Italia dei Valori (IDV), Forza Italia (FI), Partito Democratico,
Rifondazione Comunista (RIF)/Tsipras, and the Five Star Movement (FSM).2
From a methodological standpoint, through yoshikoder – an automated
manifesto for textual analysis –we have conducted a formalized content analysis of
the European electoral manifestos (2004–14) and party statutes, which have been
used extensively for analyses in order to understand the role and strenght of party
leaders. We have attributed a score (0–1) for each indicator and calculated the
overall score per dimension (per party per year) in order to compare the dimensions
across parties and years (and build an additive, ‘index of populism’). In the
qualitative part of our analysis, we have also taken into consideration further
speciﬁcations for each variable (e.g. people), such as for instance the description of
people done by the populist party (the so-called ‘linguistic qualiﬁers’), as adjectives
or adverbials. As for the analysis of the party statutes, the degree of personalization
of the party (dimension organization, indicator ‘leader power by statute’) has been
detected using the following coding criteria: rules for the election/removal of
the leader; tasks (decision-making) of the leader vs. other party bodies; rules for
membership and member participation opportunities.
2 Due to space constraints, we have moved the detailed analysis of the UDC and IDV parties in the
Appendix (Tables B and C), although we did include their numerical scores in our Table 6.
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In sum, our relative (within the same party across years, and across parties in the
same year) and continuous conceptualization of populism allows for variations
among parties concerning their level of populism on each of the four dimensions
(for a similar attempt see de Raadt et al., 2004).
We consider that applying our analysis to the European manifestos is particularly
fruitful as it may also shed a new light on Euroscepticism, especially in view of the fact
that populism and Euroscepticism are increasingly discussed, sometimes as interrelated
phenomena, in academic and political interpretations of current challenges to liberal
democracies (Mudde, 2004; Carlotti, 2015). For example, the conceptualization of the
‘pure people versus the corrupt elite’, can be used to look at the discourse of several
Eurosceptic partieswithin the European Parliament (see e.g.Nigel Farage’s intervention
at the European Parliament in 2010 and his frequent reference to ‘we’ conceived not as
the British people but as a general ‘the people’, a ‘heartland’ that represents an idealized
conception of the community; Taggart, 2004: 274).
Moreover, the re-conceptualization of the notion of Euroscepticism as a
rhetoric-like populism has been proposed by some scholars, as Leconte, who
suggests to look at the European Union (EU) ﬁrst as a subject for myths, depicting
the ‘EU as a regulatory monster’ against citizens’ ordinary life, second as a fertile
ground for the rhetoric of the ‘us vs. them’ (Leconte, 2015: 258). Finally, both
populism and Euroscepticism can be scrutinized through the lens of political
protest, as for example Canovan (1999) proposes. As already mentioned in the
opening section, populism has often been addressed as a pathology (or a shadow of
it, at best) of modern democracies such as in the case of Euroscepticism, whereas we
will consider it as a political phenomenon to be understood and not as a pathology
to be overcome.
In what follows, the empirical analysis (through electoral manifestos and statutes)
of the degree of populism within Italian parties will be conducted (third section),
underlining similarities and differences across party and within parties across time
(fourth section), and linking, in the conclusion (ﬁfth section), our main ﬁndings to
the relevant literature within which this article can be located.
Populism in context: European elections and Italian political parties
The 2014 European parliamentary elections have been depicted by many
commentators as a ‘political earthquake’, due to the striking consensus obtained by
Eurosceptic and populist parties across Europe (Carlotti, 2015). Taken together, it
has been calculated that 212 of the 715 Members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) belong to Eurosceptic parties for a total of 28% of seats (a signiﬁcant
increase with respect to the previous European elections) (Treib, 2014). Populist
parties have recently increased their electoral and social penetration everywhere in
and outside the EU. In the last 2014 European elections, right-wing populist parties
strengthened their position in an unprecedented way: for example, the Front
National in France gained 25% of votes and 24 seats (against 6.4% of 2009);
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United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in Great Britain gained 37% of votes
and 22 seats (>10% than in 2009); in Denmark the People’s Party triumphed
becoming one of the most powerful right-wing populist party of Northen Europe,
doubling its number of MPEs from 2 to 4. In Hungary, the neofascist formation
Jobbik scored the 15% (maintaining invariated its support with respect 2009) and
in the Netherlands, Geert Wilders’ Europhobic PVV gained four MEPs, with
around 13% of votes (−3% than in 2009). Within this general tendency of populist
parties strengthening across the EU, the Italian case appears as particularly inter-
esting for analysis, as it is characterized by a prolonged presence of populist parties
in government which has challenged the established party system (Albertazzi and
McDonnell, 2015).
The NL: electoral manifestos and party statute
In terms of populism as ideology, the populist ‘us’–‘them’ pattern is clearly visible in
all the three electoral manifestos of the NL (see Table 1). The category of ‘people’ is
prominent in presence, although decreasing (from 44 references in 2004, to 25 in
2009 to six in 2014). In addition, also its characteristics change across the years,
from a ‘people’ ethnically deﬁned as ‘North’ and ‘Padano’ to (already since the 2009
manifesto) a people of the North, deﬁned mainly in economic terms, on the one
hand, and ‘European peoples’, characterized in cultural-identitarian terms, on the
other hand (i.e. christians vs. muslims: ‘Turkey’, considered as ‘historically and
culturally not European’, recurs more than 30 times in the 2009 as well as in the
2014 manifesto). Indeed, the reference to the ‘North’ disappears in 2014. But the
NL’s discourse has also become increasingly nationalistic with respect to global and
European phenomena, so it also accommodates a defence of the Italian people from
outside pressures (e.g. the ‘them’ category ‘other countries’, which represent those
that want to exploit economically Italy, double its presence from 2004 to 2014).
The discourse of the NL frames the people in a way, which signiﬁcantly converges
with the deﬁnitions of populism presented above. The NL represents the ‘people’ as
inherently pure and victims of corrupt ‘elites’. The theme of the party’s
self-identiﬁcation with the people is also present here (‘the Northern League is the
voice of the people’) together with the typical populist idea of the party being called
to ﬁght a historical battle to rescue its people (Rydgren, 2007).
The NL extends the ‘us’–‘them’ scheme to the European level: the elites
which oppress the people are the European ones (the ‘technocratic elites’, ‘anti-
democratic’, representative of a ‘totalitarian regime’, ‘medieval empire’, ‘far and
obscure entity, but not abstract!’). Only ranked second are there the domestic
politicians, which are always pictured as ‘puppets’ in the hand of the ‘bureaucrats’
of Bruxelles, conniving or, at best, naives (‘buonisti’), which open the frontiers of
the country to immigration. The NL contrasts two ‘Europes’: the Europe of
peoples, which are naturally wise and virtuous, with the ‘Europe of institutions’ –
particularly the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB);
6 MANUELA CA IAN I AND PAOLO R . GRAZ IANO
and the European Court of Justice, which put in danger the rights and survival of the
people. The EU process as a whole is represented very negatively (a ‘deception’) as
the product of an anti-democratic global ideology, aiming at the dismantling of the
European system of social rights. Indeed, also the element of ‘conspiracy’ is present
in the NL manifesto. The NL (quoted frequently among the ‘us’ of the discourse,
40 times in 2004, 113 in 2009, and 25 in 2014) presents itself as the party which
embodies the ‘voice of the people’ and ﬁghts for them (to the end of ‘restore the
sovereignty of the people’ in the EU), although this relationship appears ‘elitist’.
In terms of populism as organization (an aspect which has been analysed mainly
through the statutes of the party), a similar picture of a hierarchical relation between
the party and its leader on the one hand and the voters on the other emerges: the
former being presented like the shepherd which leads the ﬂock, ‘the stimulus’ for
the country, ‘the unique political actor which support an Europe that defends the
people from the global project, that wakes up to action against a dictatorship’.
In the manifesto of the NL, we also ﬁnd many indicators of populism as a
rhetoric. There is a clear pattern of continuous and explicit delegitimation of the
‘others’ (the political establishment and political parties), either at the European
(‘elite non-democratically elected’) or at the national level.
Table 1. Northern League (NL): ideological dimension
‘Us’ N ‘Them’ N
2004
Northeners (padani) 52 EU 58
Europe 45 Politics/politicians 24
NL 40 Global/mondial/them/multinationals 18
Peoples/people 44 Other countries (USA, etc.) 14
Common localities/regions 33 Turkey 13
Countries (member, third world) 20
2009
NL 113 EU 55
Our/country 74 Euro 41
Territory 59 Government/Roma/Roman(s) 31
Family 58 Turkey/mosque 30
Europe 48 Globalization/international ﬁnance 20
Italy 45
North 28
2014
States/state (members, national) 61 EU 53
Our (territory/companies) 55 Turkey 38
Europe 45 Countries (third) 29
Italy 25 EU Commission 23
EU Parliament 20
Us (we) 17
NL 8
EU = European Union.
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The style is in fact always direct, informal (except for the 2009 manifesto where it
assumes a more ‘institutional’ shape). The typical style of ‘taboo breakers’, with
frequent appeals to enthusiam (‘lets’ bring back politics in the hands of the people’)
and fear (people are pictured as at risk of being ‘violated’ or ‘oppressed’ by the EU,
in need of being ‘defended’, make ‘safe’ against ‘any form of aggression’ and
‘external attacks’), as well as apodictic tones (verbs like ‘refuse’, ‘ﬁght’, ‘battles’,
‘oppose’, referred to the NL, recur 14 times in the 2004 manifesto, and terms like
‘unavoidable’, ‘unacceptable’, appear 10 times in the same document).
Looking at the party statute (2015) of the NL allows an additional assessment
of the organizational constraints within which the party’s President is called
to operate. The picture that emerges is that of a personalistic leadership with a
non-mediated relation with his voters. Indeed, the President, Umberto Bossi, is
‘the founding father of the NL and it is nominated ad vitam’. He is ‘guarantor
of the unity of the NL, and favours, with any suitable means, the Padanian
identity’ (Art. 14). The ad vitam nomination renders the President a powerful
and charismatic actor within the party, almost invested by a ‘divine legitimacy’,
almost like autocrats, and his role is never overseen by any other body of
the party. To sum up, concerning the leader’s power by statute, a personalistic
leadership plus a hierarchically organized functioning mode charactherize3
therefore the NL.
Democratic Party (PD): electoral manifestos and party statute
The 2004 electoral manifesto for the European elections of the Uniti nell’Ulivo
(at the time, the name of the PD) is an ‘old-style’ political manifesto made up of
59 pages with some very detailed initial considerations on the overall economic and
social state of the EU. More speciﬁcally (Table 2), from an ideological standpoint
the manifesto is aimed at an electorate made of citizens, elderly, families, and – to a
lesser extent – workers, migrants (cited six times), unemployed (cited only three
times, although the manifesto contains a section devoted to unemployment and
growth strategies), migrants (cited six times). There is no direct conceptualization to
the ‘people’ but rather of diverse categories of people such as elderly, workers, etc.
Therefore, the most striking aspect of the manifesto is that there is virtually no
‘them’ in populist terms as the only potental ‘enemy’ represented in it is ‘terrorism’
(cited 10 times) since there is no idea of a ‘conspiracy’ nor of a differentiation in
terms of counter-elite. As far as the rhetoric is concerned, there is no sign of dele-
gitimation of institutions (there is, on the contrary, the idea that the EU is a positive
anchor to be hooked to) and very limited delegitimation of other political actors
such as Berlusconi, cited only three times as an antagonist and seen as the leader
3 Indeed the NL is a ‘confederation’ territorially composed of regional ‘groups’and leaders, where, ‘the
control on the bodies of territorial delegations and local federations is made according to the principle that
the upper level organs/bodies control the lower level organs/entities’ (Art. 35).
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who has ‘worsened the condition of Italy on almost all the (economic) indicators’
(p. 3). Furthermore, there is no legitimation of new actors, which could be ‘used’
against Berlusconi or his party.
Throughout the document there is strong support for the so-called Lista Prodi
(which is another name for the electoral list and which puts more emphasis on the
leader Prodi) but there is no speciﬁc ‘populist’ style of communication in terms of
references to ‘hate’ or offering easy solutions to complex problems (on the contrary,
the detailed manifesto is an illustration of ways of trying to deal in a complex way
with complex problems), nor is there any clear appeal to emotions of fear and
enthusiasm or a direct and non-institutional communication style. Finally, with
respect to the organization, although the Lista Prodi is cited 58 times (so we may
argue that there could be some signs of personalization), both the presence and the
description of the relationship between leader, party, and electorate is not of a
populistic nature as there is no reference to the charismatic ﬁgure of the leader as a
ﬁgure of someone capable of salviﬁc acts.
The 2009 electoral manifesto is clearly inﬂuenced by the economic crisis (which
appears 18 times as an ‘external constraint’) and in contrast with the 2004 mani-
festo, criticism towards the EC is put forward in terms of the management of the
crisis. Still, the reference of the manifesto are the citizens and no speciﬁc reference to
‘people’ is made – the only reference to populism is a negative one, that is, the
populism of the right is seen as an ‘enemy’. In terms of rhetoric, a strong delegiti-
mation of the right starts to occur, and a limited form of delegitimation of the EC
also appears. For example, there is a clear reference to the need ‘not be fooled by the
populism of the right(s)’ (p. 5) or a severe critique towards the EC which has not
displayed ‘(a)nswers to the crisis which have been unsatisfactory’ (p. 6).
Table 2. Democratic Party: ideological dimension
‘Us’ N ‘Them’ N
2004 (Uniti nell’Ulivo)
Europe/European(s) 100 (International) terrorism 10
Lista Prodi 58
Citizens 30
Children 26
Consumers 18
2009
Europe/European(s) 92 Right 11
Citizens 20
Italy 10
2014
Europe/European(s) 88 Right 5
Citizens 19
Youth 12
Democrats 6
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With respect to the style of communitation there is slightly more reference to an
identiﬁed fear (the ‘crisis’) but still the overall reasoning is not simplifying nor is
there use of a non-institutional communication style. Furthermore, in terms of
organization the PD is cited only six times and never with a ‘leadership-based’
connotation, nor is there any clear reference to the relationship between leader and
party or leader and voters.
The 2014 manifesto is in line with the 2009 manifesto in terms of length and
simpliﬁcation of issue analysis. ‘Us’ is deﬁned in relation to Europe, or being Eur-
opeans (88 times), whereas the only potential enemy is a not better identiﬁed ‘right’
(mentioned ﬁve times). There is no anti-elite or anti-establishment discourse, nor is
there a deﬁnition of the people (zero mentions in the manifesto) in the name of
which the party manifesto has been adopted, whereas the ﬁnancial institutions are
seen as responsible of ‘excesses’ which need to be constrasted.
Also with reference to the rhetoric, unlike the limited signs of delegitimation that
were present in the 2009 manifesto, no strong element of delegitimation occurs, nor
is there – with respect to the communication style – any speciﬁc identifying fear or
other elements, which could have made us consider the manifesto as populist. In
terms of organization, no reference to ‘leadership’ capacities is explicitly present in
the manifesto. Furthermore, in this electoral manifesto nothing of speciﬁc interest to
us is said with reference to the relationship leader-party or leader-voters as the
leader is not mentioned in terms of centralizing or providing further legitimation to
political proposals.
Looking at the party statute of the PD (a ‘federal party’, as it auto-deﬁnes itself,
Art.1), allows an assessment of the organizational constraints within which the
party’s leader is called to operate. The decision-making of the PD includes also the
Direzione generale, which implements the indications of the assembly and decides
the political direction of the party (Art. 8), composed by 120 members. Hence, from
an organizational point of view, the PD’s leader can be considered a primus inter
pares among the party leadership, as his legitimation, action, and survival in ofﬁce
are dependent of other party’s institutions amongst which power is dispersed. In
sum, with respect to the rules for the election/removal of the leader, tasks (decision-
making) of the leader vs. those of other party bodies, and rules for membership and
member participation opportunities, no personalistic leadership emerges from the
PD statute.
Rifondazione Comunista: electoral manifesto and party statute
The 2004 electoral manifesto of Rifondazione Comunista (RC)-Sinistra Europea is
another long, old-style manifesto (98 pages). Divided into eight sections (from a
defense of the welfare state to the illustration of the consequences of a neoliberal
order), the manifesto deﬁnes an ‘us’ which is made up primarily by ‘workers’ (cited
83 in different variants – females, males, etc.), citizens (34), migrants (33), and
movements (24), and it is supported by the centrality of ‘work’ (154 times)
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(Table 3). Nevertheless, for our purposes the deﬁnition of ‘us’ is not made with
reference to an all-inclusive notion of ‘people’ but rather, in more classic Rokkanian
terms, with reference to the ‘workers’ against ‘capital’ (under the form of ‘neoli-
beralism’ or ‘liberalism’, which seems to be the main overall enemy – cited 69 times
– or capitalism/capital/capitalistic and globalization, cited 49 and 41 times,
respectively). Still, the identiﬁcation of an ‘enemy’ does not follow a populist
ideology as there is no strong, direct anti-establishment, or anti-elite discourse nor
any reference to forms of conspiracy. More traditionally, in Schmittian terms, there
is a deﬁnition of what the political enemy is and why it should be considered so. In
terms of the use of rhetoric tools, there is no delegitimation of institutional or
political actors, as also Berlusconi (cited four times) and ‘neoliberals’ are seen as
antagonists and not as illegitimate actors (e.g. on p. 19 of the manifesto, neoliberal
policies are accused of being responsible for reduced economic growth but they are
not accused of being illegitimate). The same applies to the communication style as
no reference to a ‘hate’ discourse is made, nor is there an overall simpliﬁcation of the
solutions offered in order to contrast complex problems. Also with respect to the
organization, the leaders are not even mentioned throughout the manifesto, nor are
charismatic or taumaturgic qualities supported relevant.
The 2009 electoral manifesto is even less ‘populist’, if possibile. Some keywords
virtually disappear (such as ‘capitalism’ and similar terms, which are used only
ﬁve times, or even ‘migrants’ or ‘migration’ are less present than in the 2004
electoral manifesto). Whereas in the 2004 electoral manifesto there was a deﬁnition
Table 3. Rifondazione Comunista: ideological dimension
‘Us’ N ‘Them’ N
2004
Work 154 (Neo)Liberalism* 69
Workers 83 Capital* 49
Citizens 34 Globalization 41
Migrants 33
Movements 24
2009
Europ* 54 Capital* 9
Social 19 (Neo)liberalism 6
Crisis 15 Nato 5
Work 9
Left 9
2014
Europ* 189 Capital* 21
Work 77 Austerity 20
Right/s 73 (Neo)liberalism 11
Social 32 Nato 6
Migrants 19
Public 19
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of ‘us’, in 2009, there are some references to the ‘social’ dimension (19 times), to
‘workers’ and to the ‘left’ (nine times for both) but there is no clear identiﬁcation
of ‘them’ in ideological terms. Also with reference to rhetoric tools there is no
delegitimation of institutional or political actors as ‘liberals’ or ‘neoliberals’,
similarly to the 2004 manifesto, are seen as political adversaries rather than
unlegitimate actors, and the same applies to the NATO (cited ﬁve times in the
manifesto). As for the communication style, no traces of a hate discourse can be
found, nor – although the 2009 manifesto is much briefer than the 2004 one – could
it be said that there is an overall simpliﬁcation of the solutions offered in order to
contrast complex problems. Furthermore, there is no use of terms which may be
associated with resentment or hate as the overall tone is one of mild confrontation
on policy issues: against inequality, and in favour of redistribution. Finally, with
respect to the organization, no leaders are mentioned throughout the manifesto and
a universal, non-personalized discourse is what characterizes the overall content of
the manifesto of Un’altra Europa.
The 2014 electoral manifesto (which is a manifesto of an electoral cartel which
goes beyond RC and includes also other left parties) is possibly the only one that has
some (although very limited) traces of populism, especially in the ideological and
organizational dimension. With respect to ideology, there is to some extent a more
speciﬁc deﬁnition of ‘us’ in terms of Europeans (still a bit vague, though), work
and workers (cited all together 77 times), with growing reference to the ‘social’
dimension (32 times), and to migrants (19 times). The ‘them’ dimension is not well
deﬁned, as the ‘usual general suspects’ are mentioned – such as (neo)liberalism (20)
and NATO (six times), together with austerity (20 times). Put differently, there is a
limited identiﬁcation of ‘them’ such as the ‘establishment’ or similar references,
which go under the label of ‘neoliberals’.
As far as rhetoric is concerned, there is no clear delegitimation of institutional or
political actors as – once again – (neo)liberals, capital, and capitalists, NATO are
considered to be enemies rather than unlegitimate actors. For example, there is a
will to ‘overcomeNATO’, considering it as a legitimate but disputable organization,
which has been wrongly supported by European and US governments. With respect
to the style of communication, there still is no evidence of ‘hate’ discourse, and no
oversimpliﬁcation of the solutions can be identiﬁed (actually, the 2014 manifesto is
by far more articulated and complex than the 2009 one). For example, ‘hate’ and
‘fear’ are not words which appear in the manifesto. From an organizational
perspective, some timid signs of populism can be found in the references to Tsipras
(ﬁve times) who is considered to be the ‘uniﬁer’ of the Greek left and also the
inspiration for the uniﬁcation of the Italian left. Within the statute, there is a clear
refusal of leadership-based forms of organization: ‘The Partito della Rifondazione
Comunista ﬁghts against every attitude within the top party bureaucrats and
institutional representatives to become separate groups aiming at the search of
prestigious roles and material priviledges’ (Art. 4). Similarly, to the PD statute, no
mention is made of a speciﬁc leader, as the internal party life is regulated by general
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rules, which guarantee a democratic life and party sovereignty lies in the hands
of the party members. In sum, in terms of leader power by statute, no speciﬁc
concentration of power in the hands of the leader is foreseen and therefore no signs
of populist leadership emerge. More speciﬁcally, if we look at the rules for the
election/removal of the leader, the tasks (decision-making) of the leader vs. other
party bodies, and the rules for membership and member participation opportunities
it seems quite clear that no personalistic leadership emerges.
The Five Star Movement: electoral manifestos and statute
The Five Star Movement (FSM) has not participated in European elections prior to
2014. Analysing the electoral manifesto (Table 4), within the ideological dimension
there is a clear deﬁnition of what ‘them’ is, whilst the notion of ‘us’ remains quite
vague. The main identiﬁcation of ‘us’ is Italy (18 times), the ‘nation’ (14 times), and
‘FSM’ is linked to the 12 times the term movement appears in the document ana-
lysis, while the notions of ‘community’, ‘people’, and citizens are strongly associated
to those who need to ‘resist’ to/‘them’ (ECB, International Monetary Fund, World
Bank, the EU, other Italian parties, Germany, the international ﬁnancial actors,
neoliberals). In terms of rhetoric, there is a strong tendency to delegitimize other
actors and legitimize new actors, such the Movimento itself: ‘The invisible war is a
war between an oligarchy of priviledged people representing the interests of the
supra-national speculative ﬁnancial world and the ordinary, and the citizens of the
single peoples and states‘ (Point 1, electoral manifesto). The communicatyion style
is highy informal, and aimed at mobilizing potential voters via appeals to ﬁght a
‘war’against the ‘oligarchy’ or the ‘American-English-German ﬁnance’ via a sim-
pliﬁcation of the solutions vis-à-vis complex problems. From an organizational
perspective, Beppe Grillo – the leader – is mentioned only once, although the ana-
lysis of the ‘non-statute’4 is more telling, as it clearly states that the FSM ‘represents
a platform, a channel of discussion and consultation which originates (…) from the
blog www.beppegrillo.it’ (Regolamento FSM – Art. 1). Unlike traditional parties,
there is no formalized membership nor are there organizational structures as
‘membership to the Movement does not imply greater formalities than registering
for a normal internet website (…) In order to become a member, a request will have
to be sent to the website’ (Art. 5). In other words, the website administrator (basi-
cally, Grillo and his informal collaborators) decide who can become a member, in a
fully centralized and personalized fashion. For electoral purposes, the candidates
will be designated following an electronic procedure which will be administered
centrally and in ‘unmediated’ form (Art. 7). Thus, no mediation between the leader
and the voters, and between the leader and the movement’s members is offered. In
conclusion, according to all our analytical dimensions (rules for the election/
4 In order to mark its difference with respect to the other parties which have a Statute, the FSM has
adopted a ‘non-statute’.
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removal of the leader; tasks of the leader vs. other party bodies; rules for member-
ship and member participation opportunities) the party statue clearly shows that in
terms of leader power, a fully personalistic leadership and centrally organized
functioning mode are guaranteed.
Forza Italia: electoral manifestos and party statute
Since the electoral manifestos of Forza Italia (FI) (Popolo della Libertà in 2009) is
the programme of the European People’s Party (EPP),5 we may think that populist
signs – if present – may be of a European nature rather than of a national one. In
fact, all the manifestos (2004, 2009, and 2014) open with a foreword and picture of
Berlusconi. Nevertheless, although speciﬁc populist traits can de detected for FI, we
may also consider that these are reduced in comparison with what would occur in
the case of domestic elections and domestic electoral manifestos (Verbeek and
Zaslove, 2016).
In the 2004 electoral manifesto, with respect to the ideological dimension, it
emerges quite clearly that the identity of the party is linked to individual freedom.
The ‘us’, therefore, is linked to being free and the EU is seen as an instrument to
support and reinvigorate freedom. FI sees itself as the motor of the EPP (cited
34 times) and part of Europe (cited 85 times). There is no strong identiﬁcation with
the ‘people’, whereas the ‘them’ is deﬁned in terms of international terrorism
(cited 10 times) and communism/communists (cited three times). Furthermore,
crime is considered to be an issue, but ‘criminals’ are not stigmatized as in other
electoral manifestos.
In terms of rhetoric, there is a strong legitimation of the party’s novelty as a new
actor (the party is characterized by the ‘modernity of its manifesto’ and as a party
that ‘does’ things and not simply talks about things). Furthermore, there is a
Table 4. Five Star Movement: ideological dimension
‘Us’ N ‘Them’ N
2014
Italy 18 ECB/IMF/WB/EU 9
Our/nation 14 (Other) parties 8
Movement 12 Finance (i.e. ﬁnancial actors) 5
Community 5 Germany 4
Citizens 4 Neoliberal(s) 3
People 4
ECB = European Central Bank; IMF = International Monetary Fund; WB = World Bank;
EU = European Union.
5 In 2004 and 2009, the party decided to present a manifesto that for the most part reproduced the
platform of the EPP – differently from other Italian parties which tend to produce their own.
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delegitimation of all the other actors who ‘do not have roots in Europe’ and are a
‘hybrid without any possible future no ideals (…), a product of the anomaly and
the transformism of national parties which have survived to the historical decline
of ideologies’.
The communication style is focussed on the fear that ‘peace, freedom and
democracy are not conquered once and for all, but they need to be defended every
day from the overarching threats’. The idea of a ‘battle’ for freedom is supported by
an institutional language, which is also slightly formal, although the solutions tend
to be slightly simplistic as the complexities apparently, can be addressed by means
of ‘leadership, manifesto and alliances’.
With little surprise, the dimension where populism can be seen the most is the
organizational one. Personalistic leadership is at the heart of the manifesto and
‘Forza Italia is a solid collective entity thanks to the stenght of its leadership and the
modernity of its manifesto’. Furthermore, the signature of Silvio Berlusconi opens
the manifesto and in several parts, he talks directly to the voter (‘I hope’, ‘I am
convinced’, etc.).
In the 2009 manifesto, which is presented by Il Popolo della Libertà (PdL), a new
centre-right party founded by FI and other centre-right parties, there is a (limited)
mention of the ‘people’ in the new name of the party and in the text (two times).
‘Our people’ is deﬁned as people that ‘work and produce’ who want to belong to a
liberal Europe, which is made of freedom, solidarity, and competition. ‘Us’ is
deﬁned in opposition to the ‘them’ represented by the establishment and also the
other moderate parties which are criticized for not being able to relaunch domestic
economies. Furthermore, there is a critique of the global ﬁnancial market (cited
seven times) that nevertheless does not become as strong as the one put forward by
other parties, such as the NL.
In terms of rhetoric, there is a legitimation of ‘new’ actors (such as Partito della
Libertà (PdL)) as the only ones who will be capable of taking the leadership of
European citizens and the EU as a whole, but there is no evidence of delegitimation
of other parties or institutions. Within the communication style there is no clear
mention of fear or resentment, nor is the style so direct and colloquial as the 2004
manifesto. The arguments made in the manifesto are linked to the notion of
‘responsibility’ rather to the the idea of a reaction to a catastrophe (the adjective
‘necessary’ is mentioned nine times, while the verb ‘need’ is mentioned 18 times).
Finally, there is no presentation of simplistic solutions to complex problems.
In terms of organization, there is a strong identiﬁcation of the party with the
leader (‘Silvio’) who is portrayed as a ‘normal’ person, a friend who will ‘save’ Italy,
and the website forzasilvio. it is present on the banner from which the electoral
manifesto can be downloaded.
In the 2014 electoral manifesto, from an ideological standpoint there is a greater
mention of ‘people’ and no mention of ‘citizens’. FI (the PdL party no longer exists
at this point) wants to represent a liberal and Christian Europe and is willing to
defend ‘who needs to be helped’, although there is no direct reference to a need to
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overcome an ‘establishment’ which is not even mentioned. Within the deﬁnition of
‘them’, together with Germany, the Euro and the ECB, there are ‘the judges’who are
considered to be responsible for most of the Italian problems. Berlusconi is
mentioned 27 times, and a clear identiﬁcation party-leader emerges from the
electoral manifesto.
In terms of rhetoric, there is a delegitimation of the other political actors (also
of the ‘populist antieuropean movements’ which – according to the electoral
manifesto – are against a Germany-led Europe) and a broad critique of the ‘system’
as such. Furthermore, there is a legitimation of the ‘new’ actors represented by
FI – not associated with any other parties as it was in 2009.
The communication style is a very direct and non-institutional one. The so-called
‘Kit of the candidate’ is packed with keywords and slogans, which should be used by
the candidates for the European elections, and in several parts of the manifesto
simple solutions to complex problems are offered (like the mentioned keywords and
slogans in order to answer on several topics to citizens). In 2014, the style is a ‘taboo
breaker’ one (‘in moments like the one we currently are in (…) the rules need
to be broken’) and there is a use of words linked to fear, risk (two times), danger
(two times), and crisis (ﬁve times).
Table 5. Forza Italia (FI): ideological dimension
‘Us’ N ‘Them’ N
2004
Europe 85 International terrorism 10
EPP 34 Crime(s) 8
European Union 28 Immigrants/immigration (illegal) 7
FI/Us 28 Communists/ism 3
Freedom 24
Citizens 15
USA 5
2009
Leader/party/PPE 6 Global ﬁnancial system 7
Young future generations 4 UE 5
Family 4 Terrorism/ organized crime/illegal immigration 4
People 3
Citizen(s) 2
2014
Europe 35 Euro/ECB 8
Berlusconi 27 German(s) 5
EPP 12 Countries 4
Ital* 10 Judges 2
Freedom 9 Anti-European and populist movements 2
People/everybody 7 Parties 1
EPP = European People’s Party; PPE = Partito Popolare Europeo; ECB = European
Central Bank.
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Similarly, to the previous manifestos, also in 2014 there is an identiﬁcation between
the party and the leader Berlusconi, who is mentioned 27 times and is considered to be
the only politician who can save Italians from economic and social chaos.
In the party statute, the central role is played by the leader who is responsible for
the nomination of several relevant organizational roles (namely, national and
regional coordinators) and can also – on a discretionary basis – include in the party
actors, which respond directly and solely to the President. In other words, once
elected, the President of the party has very limited internal controls over his/hers
activity, and this can be interpreted as another indicator of party-leader identiﬁca-
tion in a party where the leader has strong control over party members and
‘personalizes’ the relationship with the voters. In a nutshell, if we consider the key
analytical dimensions we have applied to all the party statutes (rules for the election/
removal of the leader; tasks of the leader vs. other party bodies; rules for member-
ship, and member participation opportunities) the highly personalistic leadership
emerges quite clearly and all together it rivals only with the cases of the NL and FSM
in terms of intensity of party leadership (Table 5).
Varieties of Italian populism: discussion
In this article, we have tried to empirically analyse populism not as a discrete
concept (according to which one party can be deﬁned as populist or not), rather
as a continuous one, establishing a variety of populisms (i.e. different degrees of
populism) within the Italian parties.
Table 6 shows how populism has progressed over the past decade in Italy.
In 2014, we clearly see the presence of one political party (FSM) that displays strong
populist traits according to our four dimensions. Furthermore, the additive index of
populism among the Italian parties analysed in this contribution (i.e. adding all the
total scores in columns obtained by each party per year) has jumped from 31 in
2004 to 53 in 2014 – an increase of over 70% – showing a generalized shift of the
Italian political system towards populism. Especially in terms of rhetoric and
communication style, there has been a growth in the ‘degree‘ of populism exhibited
by the Italian political parties. In particular, the NL emerges as the ‘most’ populist
Italian party on all four dimensions throughout the period considered in the
analysis. Only on the organizational dimension, this party is slightly ‘less’ populist
in the 2014 manifesto and, more in general, in 2009. This is probably due to the fact
that in those years the party was in power at the national level and that it gained for
the ﬁrst time EU Parliamentarians. In 2009, the NL shows less populist features, not
reaching the previously registered maximum values on three out of four dimensions
of the index, and this decrease possibly conﬁrms the validity of the fringe party
Euroscepticism hypothesis (e.g. Taggart, 1998) – according to which parties in
government are less Eurosceptic – also for the interpretation of populism. In sum, as
suggested more broadly by the literature (Biorcio, 2015), on the basis of the
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European electoral manifestos and party statutes an all-encompassing deﬁnition of
populism can easily be applied to the case of NL.
If in Italy the populist champion is represented by NL during the period
considered, also the FSM shows a high ‘degree of populism’, reaching the top score
of 15 on the populism index, as Table 6 indicates. Of course, any generalization
regarding the FSM may be premature since the general elections of 2013 and the
European elections of 2014 are the ﬁrst truly relevant elections in which the FSM
competed. In a diacronical perspective, it will be interesting to conduct future
research in order to empirically monitor the FSM and see if this strong populist
imprinting will continue over time. Continuing our analysis, also FI ranks high in
our ‘populism index’, especially in 2014 when it equals the values of the NL, and
particularly in terms of style and organization.6 Similarly, although with slightly
lower values, it is interesting to highlight the result of the IDV party, especially in
2004 and 2014, and above all on the ideological dimension (in spite the fact that
commonly this party is not included by scholars among populist parties).7 Also the
UDC, differently than the other heirs of the historical Christian-Democratic mass-
party, shows some populist traits in organization (e.g. concerning the mentioning
and presentation of the leader in the manifesto not his power by statute), ideology
and even rhetoric [accounting for a total score of 2.5 in the period considered vs. 1
of the PD and RIF, respectively]. Finally, no signiﬁcant signs of populism can be
found in the manifestos and statutes of the heirs of old Communist party (RIF)
nor – contrary to some other ﬁndings (Biorcio, 2015) – in the PD which is a ‘joint
venture’ of some heirs of both the Christian-Democratic and the Communist Party.
In sum, these results conﬁrm that considering populism as a unidimensional and
dichotomic concept does not allow a full understanding of the variations among
populist conﬁgurations and (empirical) manifestations. Instead, our ‘populism
index’ seems to be a very fruitful tool for such a purpose.
Conclusion
The exercise conducted in this article is particularly important because, on the one
hand, looking at the vast literature on the concept of populism, it goes beyond many
valuable attempts aimed at ﬁnding ideal deﬁnitions but which are then rarely tested
with empirical indicators; on the other hand, because it goes beyond most of the
existing empirical studies on attributes associated with populism which address
only one aspect at time, that is developing measurable concepts of populism by
6 In 2004, the values of FI for ideology and style are probably biased (i.e. lower than expected) since – as
already said – in this year the party decided to present a manifesto that for the most part reproduced the
platform of the EPP. Some studies describe the attitudes of FI on EU issues less Europeist than this platform
seems to suggest (Conti and Memoli, 2009).
7 Also in the case of the IDV we have to consider that probably we coded ‘biased’ values very pruden-
tially in appraising the dimensions of our index, since this party in 2004 and 2009 presented a reduced
electoral manifesto with reference to the EU (Conti and Memoli, 2009).
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narrowing it (Jagers andWalgrave, 2007). We claim that our research effort may be
able to advance populism research in three respects: (a) providing a comprehensive
picture of the evolution of the Italian party landscape over the past 10 years in terms
of populistic tendencies; (b) showing how Italian political parties’ electoral mani-
festos have been affected by their reading of the ﬁnancial and economic crisis; (c)
and, most importantly, offering an analytical framework for an accurate and
comprehensive description of populism in terms of ideology, rhetoric, commu-
nication style, and organization, in accordance with the suggestion that ‘the term
populism needs to be deﬁned and operationalized more precisely and in a relative
manner, providing the opportunity of variation among political parties across time
and space‘ (de Raadt et al., 2004: 1). More speciﬁcally, we have considered
populism not as a ‘syndrome to be cured’ but as an observable phenomenon which
may concern all political parties present in a given domestic political community.
As for the ﬁrst aspect, we argue that the careful analysis of the Italian case sug-
gests how the crisis (and the political answers which followed) has offered a great
opportunity for fully or not-so-fully populist parties to grow over time, this
conﬁrming our working hypothesis which opened the article on the impact of the
crisis on voters. Not only a new populist political party was born (the FSM) but also
most of the pre-existing political parties have accentuated their populist traits.
Furthermore, in our research, we have observed that a speciﬁc orientation of
populist parties towards Europe and the EU has emerged as (i) most of the populist
parties analysed show a clear anti-EU attitude; (ii) some of the parties’ success is
based on a xenophobic and anti-immigration form of mobilization (e.g. in the case
of the NL); and (iii) most of the populist parties show a clear anti-establishment
attitude. This said, however, we have to underline that differently than the other
Italian parties analysed, two parties – NL and FSM – can be linked to aspects of
nationalist discourse, and this is especially true in relation to Europe. Some further
(typological-categorical) distinctions, seem to be therefore in order to disentagle the
type of populism found, as for instance that between more ‘exclusionary’ (which
would be closer to the NL) and more ‘inclusionary’ (5SM) (Mudde and Kaltwasser,
2013). Further research is needed to explore these aspects in details.
The second ﬁnding regards the reasons for such increase. Our hypothesis was that
the growth of populist traits in the Italian party system could be explained by an
‘exogenous shock’ such as the ﬁnancial and economic crisis. And indeed, beyond the
quantitative analysis, the manifestos show quite clearly that one of the main triggers
for the consolidation of populist traits is linked to the growing ‘resentment’ that the
crisis has created among Italians. Especially, if we consider the differences between
the 2004, and the 2009 and 2014 electoral manifestos, criticism towards the
management of the crisis (especially in the cases of NL, IDV, and FSM) is very
clear and the electoral manifestos are full of accusations against the EU, the
EU Commission (which becomes a key target especially in the 2014 electoral
manifestos), the ECB, ‘multinationals’, ﬁnancial actors, etc. Put differently, the crisis
becomes an evident trigger for the consolidation of populist traits in terms of the
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identiﬁcation of ‘them’, that is the EU institutions and leaders, as EU institutional
actors are seen as responsible of inaction, or of ‘wrong’ action under the form of
austerity, and therefore to be sanctioned. Furthermore, following these lines of
thought, as mentioned above, it could be argued that FSMwould never have been so
succesful without the crisis. To be sure, even if we consider the other traditional
explanations of populism growth – crisis of representative democracy (Taggart,
2000; Mény and Surel, 2002); mix of modernization crisis, insecurity,
and authoritarian legacies (Mudde, 2007); social and economic factors (Rydgren,
2005) – the recent European ﬁnancial and economic crisis can be considered as one
of the main triggers for the populist ‘boom’ as the other above mentioned variables
require more than 10 years to become highly inﬂuencial. In this regard, our ﬁndings
conﬁrm the link between populism and Euroscepticism and political protest as
suggested by Canovan (1999) who argues that populist movements should be seen
as a shadow casted by democracy itself, as they ﬁnd available space to rise and grow
in power in the gap between the two aspects of democracy, the facet of redemption
(proposing salvation through politics involving the power of people through
elections) and the facet of pragmatism (institutions aimed at limiting, constituting,
and organizing power).
Lastly, we believe that our methodology and overall approach can be applied
accross time and space in order to grasp the ‘degree of populism’ in any given
political system. In this respect, the aim of our research design has been not to take a
simple snapshot of Italian populism as expressed in the European elections, but
rather to provide an updated trajectory of Italian populism through a theoretical
and empirical analysis which may be of interest also for other studies.
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